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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20020215-SC
v.

RONALD K. CLARK,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for operation of a clandestine laboratory, a first
degree felony; possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second
degree felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. This Court
has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(i) (Supp. 2002).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Was defendant's trial counsel ineffective for not objecting to testimony
where counsel's conduct was consistent with his reasonable trial
strategy and, in any case, objections to the cumulative testimony would
not have changed the outcome of the trial?
Ineffective assistance claims raised for the first time on appeal present questions of
law reviewed for correctness. State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 13, 55 P.3d 1131.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions are relevant to this appeal and reproduced
at Addendum A:
United States Const. Amend. 6;
Utah Const, art. I, § 12.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance precursor and/or
laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation, a first degree felony; unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent
to distribute, a second degree felony; and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a
class B misdemeanor (R. 67-68). After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as charged
(R. 165-68). Defendant was subsequently sentenced to five-years-to-life for operating a
clandestine meth lab, one-to-fifteen-years for possession of meth with intent to distribute,
and 180 days for possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 173-74).
A final judgment in defendant's case was entered on 17 July 2001 (R. 173-74).
Defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal on or about 8 October 2001 (R. 192). On 17
January 2002, this Court granted the State's motion to dismiss the case for failure to file a
timely notice of appeal but remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing because
"defendant was denied his constitutional right to appeal" by his trial counsel (R. 222).
On 11 March 2002, the trial court entered a final judgment resentencing defendant (R.
244-45). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on 20 March 2002 (R. 264).
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Evidence Supporting Defendant's Guilt
In July, 1999, Marilyn Milburn, a caseworker with the Division of Child and
Family Services, visited defendant's home to investigate allegations that defendant was
using methamphetamine ("meth") and providing an unsafe environment for his two-yearold son (R. 284:63, 65, 80, 84). Defendant was initially quite defensive when Milburn
arrived (R. 284:64). Only after talking for about a half-hour on the porch did defendant
begin to calm down, although he remained somewhat tense throughout the meeting (R.
284:64, 103).
During her visit, Milburn noticed sores on defendant's body and several items that
reminded her of things she had recently seen in a class on meth labs (R. 284:65, 67, 74,
79). She also noticed a smell in a shed behind defendant's house "that I have associated
with meth" (R. 284:70). Although defendant allowed Milburn into his house, he refused
to let her open the door to or enter his bedroom (R. 284:77).
When Milburn completed her visit with defendant, Milburn reported what she had
seen to the local police (R. 284:78-79). She also informed the police of a surveillance
system defendant had constructed, including a camera and voice monitors, that covered
the sidewalk and entrance to his front yard (R. 284:71-73, 79).
Based on Milburn's information, the police obtained a no-knock warrant to search
defendant's property and truck (R. 284:138-39). They served the warrant on defendant
on July 16, 1999 (R. 284:123; R. 285:199-200).
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In defendant's truck bed, officers found a trash bag with tubing attached, two cans
of acetone, hydrochloric acid, a Mountain Dew bottle with residue in it, and 5.5 pounds of
iodine crystal (R. 284:124-26, 140-41, 147-48; R. 285:206, 284-85; St. Exh. 8). In
defendant's house, officers found a gas mask (R. 285:205; St. Exh. 8). In a large shed
behind defendant's home, officers found a bong, paper filters, glass jars filled with
unknown liquids, muriatic acid, acetone, paint thinner, a scale, a bent-neck flask, torches,
a Pyrex glass tube, hundreds of plastic baggies, four hand-guns, $300 in cash, and an ice
chest (R. 285:198, 204, 207, 254, 285-86; St. Exh. 8). Inside the ice chest, officers found
paper filters, coffee filters, toluene, acetone, muriatic acid, various jars containing tan or
dark liquids, and a basting bulb (R. 284:269-70; R. 285:269-70; St. Exh. 8, 13, 14).
At trial, the State presented six witnesses—Marilyn Milburn, State Trooper Brad
Marshall, West Valley Police Sergeant Cody Acocks, Officer Doran Denney, Detective
Alva Davis, and Officer Jeff Payne—who testified that the items found in defendant's
shed, truck, and house were consistent with the operation of a meth lab (R. 284:67, 69,
70, 74; R. 284:126; R. 284:140, 147-48; R. 285:198, 204-07, 234; R. 285:253-54, 285-86;
R. 285:353-62, 363-64, 368-69).
Marilyn Milburn testified that as she walked through defendant's yard during the
home visit, she saw a corked beer bottle with a hose coming out of it and leading to a
Tupperware container (R. 284:67; St. Exh. 1). This apparatus looked similar to what
Milburn had seen during her meth lab training. In defendant's shed, she saw several
bottles on the counter with a dirty, yellow-colored liquid inside that also reminded her of
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a meth lab (R. 284:69, 78-79). She also saw an ice chest in the shed that was large
enough to transport a meth lab (R. 284:74). Because defendant already had a working
refrigerator in the shed, the ice chest interested her (R. 284:98). Finally, Milburn
described a round-bottomed flask with paper in it hanging from the ceiling of defendant's
shed (R. 284:70).
Brad Marshall testified that he effected a traffic stop on defendant as part of
serving defendant with the no-knock search warrant (R. 284:121). In the bed of
defendant's truck, Marshall noticed several items, including paint thinner, associated with
meth labs (R. 284:124-26).
Cody Acocks was present when defendant's truck was seized (R. 284:238-39).
Acocks testified that he was concerned about a trash bag with tubing attached that was
found in defendant's truck bed because such a concoction could be used "as a vent tube
for the process of manufacturing methamphetamine" (R. 284:140-41). Acocks testified
that he also found acetone, acids, and two forms of iodine, all associated with meth labs,
in defendant's truck bed (R. 284:147).
Doran Troy Denney testified that, during the search of defendant's property on
July 16, he was assigned to photograph, catalogue, and process the evidence (R. 185:19798). Denney testified that approximately sixty-nine items were catalogued, most of which
were found either in defendant's shed or truck (R. 285:204; St. Exh. 8, 11-37). Denney
testified that acetone, hydrochloric acid, and muriatic acid found in defendant's
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possession are used in meth labs (R. 285:208). He also concluded, "There is enough
equipment here to construct and cook methamphetamine" (R. 285:234).
Detective Alva Davis testified that he recognized the torch, scale, plastic baggies
and makeshift bong found in defendant's shed as drug paraphernalia (R. 285:254). When
asked about other incriminating evidence found on defendant's property, Davis identified
the ice chest containing acetone, filters, and other items that he "associate[d] with" meth
labs (R. 285:269). Davis noted that, in a meth lab, paper filters "are used to strain out the
cook after it is finished, or to strain the precursor chemicals" (R. 285:285).
In addition, Davis testified that the burn marks on the ceiling of defendant's shed
consistent with meth production and "stuff hanging from the ceiling, which would allow a
person to hang a vent tube to perform a cook from" (R. 285:269). Davis also described a
round-bottomed flask "that was being cleaned out with paper, which [he] see[s] numerous
times with meth labs" (R. 285:269-70).
Davis also identified as incriminating the iodine, acetone, hydrochloric acid,
Mountain Dew bottle, and the vent tube found in defendant's truck (R. 285:284-85). He
also identified defendant's glass jars, other jars containing unknown murky liquids,
muriatic acid, paint thinner, and a Pyrex glass tube as associated with meth production.
Davis testified that the military-type respirator found in defendant's house was "of the
type that might be used by someone . . . during the methamphetamine manufacturing
process" (R. 285:286). He testified that he knew of no use for such a vent tube except in
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meth labs, and explained that such tubes are "commonly attached to the cooking vessel"
(R. 285:285).
Finally, Jeff Payne testified how the items found in defendant's shed could be used
to make meth. He testified that the three main ingredients of meth are red phosphorus,
pseudoephedrine, and iodine (R. 285:348). Consistent with the scale found in defendant's
shed, Payne testified that these chemicals are usually "weighed out in dry weight" before
they are used (R. 285:350).
Payne then explained that pseudoephedrine is usually obtained by extracting it
from over-the-counter nasal decongestants (R. 285:351). Typically, that is done by
soaking decongestant tablets in a solvent, such as lacquer thinner or acetone, both found
on defendant's property (R. 285:351). The result is a white sludge at the bottom and a
cloudy liquid of pseudoephedrine on top (R. 285:352). The pseudoephedrine is then
extracted and dried (R. 285:352). Ajar found in defendant's shed, which contained "a
cloudy liquid above a white layer," resembled "what pseudoephedrine looks like as it is
being extracted" (R. 285:353; St. Exh. 31).
Red phosphorus is extracted from matchbook striker plates by placing the plates in
a solvent and then using a coffee filter, like those found in defendant's shed, to filter the
phosphorus out (R. 285:361-62).
When those chemicals are combined with a small amount of water in a reaction
vessel, the iodine and red phosphorus cause a chemical reaction that turns the
pseudoephedrine into methamphetamine (R. 285:348-49). The reaction vessel can be
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scientific glassware or "something very simple such as a glass coffee pof' (R. 285:349).
Application of external heat speeds up the process (R. 285 348). A vent bag is usually
used at this point to catch the deadly gases produced during the chemical process (R.
285:359).
Once the cooking process is finished, the substance is strained to remove any
solids (R. 285:349). Then, a chemical, most often sodium hydroxide, also found in
defendant's shed, is used to raise the pH level of the substance as high as possible to
produce "meth oil or meth base" (R. 285:349, 355).
At that point, the meth can be extracted out of the liquid (R. 285:349). This can be
done in two ways (R. 285:349). One method is to put the oil into a glass vessel, such as
the flask found in defendant's shed, and then run a hose to a condenser column, usually a
glass tube inside another glass tube (R. 285:349, 364). As the meth oil heats, the water
inside turns into a vapor and the meth molecules are lifted through the tube into the
condenser column (R. 285:349-50). The result is meth in liquid form (R. 285:350). Acid,
most commonly either hydrochloric or muriatic, both of which were found on defendant's
property, is then added to the liquid to lower the pH so that it is compatible with the
human body (R. 285:350, 354-55).
The other method is to put hydrochloric acid in one container and salt, rock or
table, in another, with tubes connecting the two containers (R. 285:350). As the meth oil
runs through the containers, the meth molecules are extracted (R. 285:350). Adding a
solvent, such as the acetone found on defendant's property, "will help extract all of the
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waste products out of it, so they get a more pure methamphetamine,' (R. 285:352). A
turkey baster, such as found on defendant's property, is then used to siphon off the waste
products (R. 285:358). The dark beer bottle connected by tubing to the white container
which was found on defendant's property is consistent with this method (R. 285:357). In
both cases, once the meth dries, it is ready for use (R. 285:350, 354).
Payne concluded that the items found on defendant's property were sufficient to
cook meth (R. 285:394). Moreover, the 5.5 pounds of iodine found in defendant's truck
would yield up to four pounds of meth (R. 285:363). Although iodine is also used to treat
horses, the amounts used for that purpose are "very small" (R. 285:362). Finally, the only
items defendant lacked—i.e, red phosphorus and possibly pH strips and rock salt—could
easily be obtained by "a trip to the grocery store" (R. 285:394).
In addition to this testimony, both Milburn and Officer Julia Jorgensen testified
that the odor in defendant's shed was consistent with meth production (R. 284:70; R.
285:238). Defendant's fingerprints were found on the 5.5 pound can of iodine found in
his truck and on one of the acetone cans (R. 285:211-12; St. Exh. 51).
The State also presented lab results of tests conducted on white powder found in
three plastic baggies and substances found in numerous glass jars in defendant's shed.
One sample taken from a plastic baggy tested positive for .21 grams of meth (R. 285:32324,). Another gave an initial positive indication for amphetamine or methamphetamine,
but was too weak to test further (R. 285:322-23).
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Samples from two of the glass jars tested positive for 10 millileters and 14.8 grams
of meth respectively (R. 285:323-24). A third sample tested positive for iodine, a meth
precursor (R. 285:320). A fourth, taken from a baby jar, tested positive for ephedrine or
pseudoephedrine, another meth precursor (R. 285:322). Four others tested positive for a
secondary amine, which meth is, but were not tested further (R. 285:318, 319, 321). One
bottle tested positive for both meth and pseudoephedrine, which was consistent with a
meth cooking process in which all of the pseudoephedrine was not fully expended (R.
285:339, U4, 394).
Finally, the State presented the testimony of defendant's friend, Yvette Bickley.
Bickley, a former meth addict, had purchased meth from defendant "a couple of times"
(R. 284:162-63). Bickley testified that, on one occasion a few months prior, she walked
into defendant's shed and saw glass balls and tubes, "junk all hooked together with fire
underneath [it]" (R. 284:160). When she asked defendant what he was doing, defendant
said he was cooking dope (R. 284:159-61). Bickley also testified that after Milburn had
visited defendant's home, defendant gave Bickley a box to hide in her basement (R.
284:164-65). Defendant told Bickley the box contained his meth lab (R. 284:165).
The defense.
In his opening statement, defense counsel acknowledged the evidence would
establish that defendant was a meth user and that he possessed drug paraphernalia for that
purpose (R. 284:49-50). However, counsel argued the evidence would not establish that
defendant manufactured meth or that he distributed it (R. 284:50). Although counsel
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conceded that the items seized by police could be used for making and distributing meth,
he asserted that the evidence would show the items were not used for that purpose here
(R. 284:50-51, 59-60). Rather, the evidence would show that defendant was a craftsman
who collected all types of things from various sources and, using the chemicals he had
acquired, restored and created new things out of that clutter (R. 284:51, 59-60).
In pursuit of that defense, counsel conceded that the items identified by the State's
witnesses could be used to manufacture and distribute meth (R. 284:50). However, he
vigorously challenged the State's contention that defendant used them for that purpose
here. First, counsel cross-examined the State's witnesses on the "tons and tons of clutter"
they had observed in defendant's yard and shed, on the innocent projects defendant used
that clutter for, and on the legal uses of the items seized by the State consistent with those
projects (R. 284:92-95, 97, 99, 110, 117, 149-50; R. 285:224, 226, 227-29, 230, 240-41,
242, 256-58, 260-61, 265-68, 273-75, 287, 378-79, 381, 384-85, 391-92).
Then, counsel called defendant as his first witness (R. 286:405). Defendant
admitted that he was a former meth user and that he had used the bong and torch in his
shed to smoke it (R. 286:423, 429, 438-39). Defendant also admitted that he "had a
container of liquid methamphetamine" for purely interest's sake and that the two baggies
of meth powder were also his (R. 286:441-42). Finally, defendant admitted that he
owned most of the other bottles found on his property, as well as most of the other items
the officers had associated with a meth lab (R. 286:431-32, 437-38). However, defendant
explained that he had used most of those items legally (R. 286:411-420, 424-26).
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Defendant denied any knowledge of the beer bottle with tubes coming out of it and any
ownership of the baby jars seized from his shed (R. 286:433, 438-39). He also denied
knowledge or ownership of the iodine or trash bag with tubes found in his truck (R.
286:436, 446). According to defendant, these were items that neighbors or friends must
have dropped off in his yard without notice (R. 286:418-19, 436, 438-39). <
Defense counsel then called David Duckworth, a meth lab inspector with the Salt
Lake Valley Health Department, who was called out to defendant's home after the police
had searched it (R. 286:456). Duckworth testified that he had investigated the shed in
which most of the alleged meth lab equipment was found and that he had concluded the
shed posed no imminent health threat (R. 286:457, 458-61., 463-65, 467). Duckworth also
testified that the chemical splatter he saw in the shed was not unique to a clandestine meth
lab but was consistent with any room in which chemicals are used (R. 286:467).
Finally, defense counsel called two of defendant's friends, Donald Jackson and
Terry Ann Smith (R. 286:467, 476). Jackson testified that he was a good friend of
defendant's and that they shared a lot common interests, including working on cars (R.
286:469). Jackson said he visited defendant about once a week and often saw him
soldering things and working on cars, radios and other types of equipment (R. 286:46972). Jackson explained that acetone, muriatic acid, hydrochloric acid, and toluene were
all useful for such things (R. 286:472-75). Jackson also explained that defendant used the
plastic baggies for stamps and coins (R. 286:473). Finally, Jackson testified that he and
others often brought things to defendant for repairs or whatnot (R. 286:472, 474-75). If
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defendant was not home, Jackson would just leave the project for him outside his shed (R.
286:472).
Smith testified that she saw defendant two or three times a week (R. 286:477).
According to Smith, "everybody" knew defendant could fix things and that he collected
things they did not want (R. 286:477). Smith testified that sometimes she and defendant
would come out of his shed after talking for hours to find that people had just left things
for him outside or in his truck (R. 286:478). Finally, Smith testified that she had seen
defendant work on cars and use baggies for jewelry, stamps and coins (R. 286:479).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
for not objecting to Marilyn Milburn's and Alva Davis's testimony that evidence found in
defendant's home was consistent with a meth lab. To show ineffective assistance,
defendant must show both that counsel performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced
by counsel's deficient performance. Defendant makes neither showing.
First, defendant's claim that counsel performed deficiently rests solely on his
contention that counsel could have objected to the challenged testimony and did not.
Failure to raise a colorable objection does not by itself constitute deficient performance.
Rather, defendant must also show that counsel's decision not to object fell outside the
wide latitude given counsel in determining trial strategy. Because defendant has not
made that showing here, defendant's claim fails.
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Second, counsel's decision not to object to the challenged testimony was
consistent with the sound trial strategy set out in his opening statement. Because
counsel's decision had a reasonable basis supporting it, that decision did not constitute
deficient performance.
Finally, even if defense counsel's performance was deficient, defendant was not
prejudiced by it. Most of Milburn's testimony was cumulative and defendant challenges
Davis's testimony only as to its form, not its substance. Given these facts and the
otherwise compelling evidence against defendant, there is no reasonable probability that,
absent the challenged evidence, the results of defendant's trial would have been different.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR
NOT OBJECTING TO TESTIMONY WHERE COUNSEL'S
CONDUCT WAS CONSISTENT WITH HIS TRIAL STRATEGY
AND, IN ANY CASE, OBJECTIONS TO THE CUMULATIVE
TESTIMONY WOULD NOT HAVE CHANGED THE OUTCOME
OF THE TRIAL
Defendant claims that his trial counsel "rendered ineffective assistance of counsel
in failing to challenge the testimony of [Marilyn] Milburn . . . when she opined that items
and an odor located in [defendant's] shed were related to rnethamphetamine production"
and "in failing to challenge Detective Davis' testimony as impermissible opinion
testimony directing the jury how to decide an ultimate issue of fact, to wit, whether
[defendant] was operating a meth lab," Aplt. Br. at 22, 35. Defendant does not challenge
the testimony of the other five witnesses nor claim that his counsel should have
challenged their testimony.
14

To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must show
both that his counsel "rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment" and that "counsel's deficient performance
prejudiced him." State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted); see
also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
The State does not reach whether defendant's challenges to the testimony have
merit because defendant has failed to establish that counsel was deficient in not objecting
to the testimony or that he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged deficiency.
A.

Testimony challenged on appeal.

Milburn's testimony. Defendant claims his counsel was ineffective "in failing to
challenge the testimony of Milburn . . . when she opined that items and an odor located in
[defendant's] shed were related to methamphetamine production." Aplt. Br. at 22.
Defendant claims counsel should have objected to Milburn's testimony under rule 701,
Utah Rules of Evidence, which allows lay opinion testimony where that testimony is
rationally based on the witness's perception and helpful to the jury, and rule 702, which
allows expert testimony. See Aplt. Br. at 23, 31; Utah R. Evid. 701, 702.
Defendant's claim is based on the following testimony:
1.

When Milburn first met defendant, she noticed he had 'large sores"
on "his legs [and] arms" that "looked like the sores that we had been
shown in meth training" (R. 284:65). See Aplt. Br. at 22-24.

2.

In defendant's back yard, Milburn saw "a beer bottle that had a cork
in it, with a hose coming out and leading into a Tupperware
container" that "look[ed] just like the stuff they showed us in the
meth lab training" (R. 284:67). See Aplt. Br. at 24.
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3.

The large shed in defendant's back yard had "[a] smell that I have
associated with meth" (R. 284:70). See Aplt. Br. at 24.

4.

In the same shed, Milburn noticed "a large, blue ice chest on the
floor" that "was one of the items that we had been shown that they
transport meth labs in" (R. 284:74). See Aplt. Br. at 24.

5.

After completing her visit of defendant's home, Milburn contacted
the police "and let them know what items I had seen" (R. 284:78).
She described for them "the beer bottle .. . with the tubing coming
out of it" and "bottles that I had seen on the counter top, that had
yellow liquid in them, that to me looked like could be the process of
making meth" (R. 284:79). See Aplt. Br. at 24.

Although defendant's brief refers to Milburn's testimony concerning a roundbottomed flask with shredded paper inside, defendant's surveillance system, a gun in
defendant's shed, and a small bottle of mercury defendant had shown her, see Aplt. Br. at
24, Milburn never testified that any of these items were associated with a meth lab. Thus,
none of this testimony is relevant to defendant's claim on appeal.
Davis's testimony. Defendant also claims his counsel was ineffective in failing to
object to Davis's testimony "as impermissible opinion testimony directing the jury how to
decide an ultimate issue of fact, to wit, whether [defendant] was operating a meth lab."
Aplt. Br. at 35. He claims counsel should have objected to Davis's testimony under rule
704, Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides that otherwise admissible opinion testimony
"is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact.. See Aplt. Br. at 35; Utah R. Evid. 704.
Defendant's claim is based on the following testimony::
1.

That the torch, bong, scale, and plastic baggies found in defendant's
shed were "drug paraphernalia" (R. 285:254). See Aplt. Br. at 36-37.
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2.

That the torch found "is commonly used for soldering, that I have
seen; but, for the most part, I have aever encountered it being used
for soldering. [I have seen it used] [t]o heat up drugs and glass pipes,
to the point that they can be vaporized and ingested" (R. 285:255).
See Aplt. Br. at 37.

3.

That the round-bottomed flask found "was being cleaned out with
paper, which I see numerous times with meth labs" when a cook
wants "to clean out their glassware" after a cook (R. 285:269-70).
See Aplt. Br. at 37.

4.

That Davis "ha[s] never seen acetone in a body shop" (R. 285:268).
See Aplt. Br. at 38.

5.

That incriminating items found on defendant's property included
hydrochloric acid, 5.5 pounds of iodine, containers of acetone, a vent tube,
paper filters "used to strain out the cook after it is finished, or to strain the
precursor chemicals," muriatic acid, paint thinner, the scale, quart jars, the
bent-neck flask, the plastic baggies, the torch, a Pyrex glass tube, jars with
mixed liquids in them, a military-type respirator, and containers "with what
I believe was meth" (R. 285:285-86). See Aplt. Br. at 38.

6.

That "the vent tube . . . is the tubing that's connected to the top of a
glass reaction vessel used in meth labs . . . [s]uch as the roundbottomed flask right here" (R. 285:285). See Aplt. Br. at 38.

7.

That, when asked if "there [is] any other use . . . , as far as you know,
[for] a vent tub, than in methamphetamine manufacture," Davis
responded, "No" (R. 285:285). See Aplt. Br. at 38.

8.

That, in response to defense counsel's question whether Davis found
"multiple illustrations of how that butane torch was used in making
all sorts of things inside that shed," Davis responded, "That specific
torch, no, I did not" (R. 285:257). See Aplt. Br. at 37.1

defendant misstates this part of Davis's testimony in his brief. Defendant claims
Davis's response came after defense counsel "asked Davis whether the butane torch could
have legitimate as well as illicit uses." Aplt. Br. at 37. As the record above shows,
defense counsel's question was not that broad.
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9.

That, when defense counsel asked Davis to identify other items "you
rely on in saying that there was a meth lab in there," Davis identified
the ice chest containing acetone and filters "that I associate with
labs," the "burn marks on the ceiling," and "stuff hanging from the
ceiling, which would allow a person to hang a vent tube to perform a
cook from" (R. 285:268-69). See Aplt. Br. at 37.

B.

Defendant has not shown counsel performed deficiently because
he has failed to address counsel's overall trial strategy.

In assessing whether trial counsel "rendered deficient performance which fell
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment," State v. Chacon, 962
P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998), this Court "must keep in mind 'the variety of circumstances
faced by defense counsel [and] the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to
represent a criminal defendant.'" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990)
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)); Parsons v. Barnes, 871
P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994). Because this Court "give[s] trial counsel wide latitude in
making tactical decisions," this Court "will not question such decisions unless there is no
reasonable basis supporting them." State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996)
(quoting Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995)) (emphasis added).
Thus, to succeed on a claim that trial counsel performed deficiently, defendant
must "rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action
might be considered sound trial strategy." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19, 12 P.3d
92 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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1.

Defendant's claim that counsel performed deficiently fails
because it rests solely on his contention that counsel could
have objected to testimony but did not.

A claim that trial counsel performed deficiently must rest on more than mere
failure to object when counsel has a basis to do so. Rather, defendant must also show that
counsel's decision not to object had "no reasonable basis supporting [it]." Crosby, 927
P.2d at 644 (citation omitted). See, e.g., State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41,fflf40-44, 48 P.3d
931 (holding failure to object to evidence of defendant's prior incarcerations was not
deficient performance where omission was part of trial strategy); State v. Bullock, 791
P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989) (holding failure to object to arguably inadmissible
testimony from two witnesses was not deficient performance where trial strategy was to
"mount an effective attack on [the witness's] motives and methods," and "present[]
countervailing testimony" so as to "attack the quality of the State's evidence"); State v.
Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, % 31, 63 P.3d 110 (holding failure to object to admission of
surveillance videotape offered without adequate foundation was not deficient
performance where counsel "used it as part of his trial strategy"); State v. Villarreal, 857
P.2d 949, 955-56 (Utah App. 1993) (holding failure to object to evidence of defendant's
probation status and previously dismissed charges was not deficient performance where
"counsel apparently elected not to object... in order to pursue the trail strategy of
attacking the [State's] investigation"), aff'd by 889 P.2d 419, 427 (Utah 1995).
Here, defendant claims counsel's failure to object "cannot be perceived as tactical
in any way given that he could have made an objection outside of the presence of the jury
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and briefly on the record without undue inconvenience to the court and without
overemphasizing her testimony to the jury." Aplt. Br. at 31 (addressing Milburn's
testimony under rule 701); Aplt. Br. at 35 (addressing Milburn's testimony under rule
702); Aplt. Br. at 42 (addressing Davis's testimony under rule 704).
Neither of defendant's arguments—that the objections could have been made
without unduly inconveniencing the court or overemphasizing evidence to the jury—is
sufficient if counsel's decision not to object is otherwise consistent with his overall trial
strategy. Here, defendant has not even attempted to identify his counsel's overall trial
strategy, let alone show that counsel's decision not to object to Milburn's and Davis's
testimony was inconsistent with it. See Aplt. Br. at 22-31. Absent such a showing,
defendant has not rebutted the "strong presumption that under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, at f
19 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
2.

Defendant's claim that counsel performed deficiently fails
because counsel's decision not to object to Milburn's and
Davis's testimony was consistent with sound trial strategy.

Counsel's decision not to object in this case was consistent with a sound trial
strategy. Defendant was charged with operation of a clandestine meth lab, a first degree
felony; unlawful possession of meth with intent to distribute, a second degree felony; and
use or possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (R. 67-68). The evidence
against defendant was compelling. Defense counsel knew that, in addition to Milburn
and Davis, the State would call five witnesses who would testify that the smell in
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defendant's shed and some sixty-nine items taken from his property were consistent with
meth production, distribution, and personal use (R. 284:67, 69, 70, 74, 78-79, 124-26,
140-41, 147; R. 285: 204, 206, 207, 208, 234, 238, 269-70, 284-85, 286, 353, 394).
Defense counsel also knew that other experts would testify that numerous items seized
from defendant's shed tested positive for meth or meth precursors, and that one item
tested positive for both meth and a meth precursor, which was consistent with a cooking
process in which not all the precursor was used up (R. 285:318-324, 339, 344, 348, 394).
Finally, defense counsel knew that a former friend of defendant's would testify that she
had seen defendant operating a meth lab a few months earlier and that defendant had
recently asked her to hide his meth lab in her basement (R. 284:159-61, 164-65).
In light of this daunting evidence, defense counsel made a reasonable strategic
decision—clearly set out in his opening statement—regarding how to best defend his
client. Concerning the misdemeanor drug paraphernalia charge, counsel conceded, and
defendant would testify, that defendant was a meth user and that he possessed
paraphernalia for that purpose (R. 284:49-50). Thus, counsel could potentially mute
some of the more obviously inculpatory evidence—the meth powder, the bong, and the
torch—seized from defendant's shed.
Concerning the felony meth lab and meth distribution charges, counsel would
"attack the quality of the State's evidence in an effort to persuade the jury of the
insufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction." Bullock, 791 P.2d at 160. He
would do so, however, not by challenging the testimony of the six State witnesses
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concerning whether items found around defendant's home could be used in
manufacturing meth. Given the futility of such a challenge—as shown by defendant's
challenging only two of those witnesses on appeal—counsel reasonably decided to
concede that point (R. 284:50 ("You know what, they are, in fact, used in the
manufacturing process of methamphetamine")). Rather, counsel decided to challenge the
State's contention that those items were used to make meth in this case (the 'legal use
defense"). Thus, he would focus on the legal uses for most of the items (R. 284:60 ("[I]f
you can find alternate explanations, legal explanations for the use of these things, you
have reasonable doubt")). He would also focus on defendant as "a very talented, artistic
individual" with "a gift for making things" who did in fact put those items to those legal
uses (R. 284:51; R. 284:60 ("If you have a person who can explain

. . . why they use

this stuff in restoring equipment, upholstering furniture, making toys for their children,
you have reasonable doubt")). Finally, he would present defendant as "the consummate
pack rat" who had collected thousands of different things, sometimes without his
knowledge, "[n]ot because of what it is right now, but because [of] what he might be able
to potentially do with it or turn it into" (R. 284:51, 59).
Milburn's and Davis's testimony was crucial to counsel's reasonable trial strategy
to present this legal use defense. First, because counsel had conceded that defendant was
a meth user and that certain items found on defendant's property could be used to produce
and distribute meth, counsel had no reason to challenge Mitlburn's or Davis's testimony
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on that issue.2 Second, by allowing such testimony, counsel created a prime opportunity
to challenge the State's contention that those items were actually used by defendant to
produce and distribute meth in this case.
As set out above, Milburn was the first witness to testify at trial (R. 284:61). She
was also the only investigator called by the State who was familiar with defendant's
creative talents and hobbies, as well as the explanations he had given for the things he had
collected (R. 284:66-69, 70, 94, 117). Finally, Milburn had only limited knowledge of
meth labs at the time she visited defendant's home (R. 284:84).
This combination of factors provided counsel with a major opportunity, early in
the State's case-in-chief, to usher in his defense and "attack the quality of the State's
evidence." Bullock, 791 P.2d at 160. Thus, through Milburn, the jury learned that
defendant was "[a] very creative, ingenious man," a "very intelligent" man who "had a lot
of ideas" (R. 284:69, 93). The jury learned that defendant's yard was full of "[ejxtreme
clutter, tons and tons of items everywhere" and that "[everything . . . was something that
[defendant] had plans for, that he was going to do" (R. 284:66-69, 93). The jury learned
that defendant had "a lot of projects going on in different places," and that there were
numerous things in his yard "that [defendant] had built with his hands, that he had

2

This includes Milburn's testimony concerning the beer bottle with a hose coming
out, the blue ice chest, and the bottles with yellow liquid in them that she saw in
defendant's shed (R. 284:67, 74, 79). See Aplt. Br. at 24. It also includes her statement
concerning the sores on defendant's arms and legs, which Milburn associated with "meth
use" (R. 284:65). See Aplt. Br. at 22-24. Finally, it includes Davis's testimony that the
torch, bong, and plastic baggies were "drug paraphernalia" (R. 285:254). See Aplt. Br. at
36-37.
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welded, that he had put together, that he had made" (R. 284:94, 117). The jury learned
that defendant explained to Milburn that he used the beer bottle contraption to make beer,
not meth (R. 284:67); and that the round-bottomed flask was something he had found and
that the paper inside "was old money from a box that he had found beforef,] just a
collector kind of thing" (R. 284:70). Finally, the jury learned that each of the items and
chemicals used to make meth "can be legally obtained by going to stores" and that some
of those chemicals, such as acetone, were not "incompatible with the kinds of things that
[defendant] was doing at the house" (R. 284:92, 94, 95).
All this evidence furthered defendant's legal use defense. If defense counsel had
objected to Milburn's first statement connecting defendant to meth, as defendant now
claims he should have, much of this evidence may not have come in so early in the State's
case. As defendant concedes, Milburn's testimony concerning that meth connection was
merely cumulative of "superior testimony of the State's other witnesses." See Aplt. Br. at
30. Thus, her testimony, while useful to the State, was not essential. Given that fact, if
counsel had objected to Milburn's initial statement connecting defendant to meth—before
Milburn had offered any useful evidence for the defense—the State may very well have
cut short her testimony. Although counsel surely could have called Milburn as a defense
witness had this eventuality occurred, the impact of her testimony, increased exactly
because she was an early State witness, would have been greatly diminished. Counsel's
decision not to object to the testimony, therefore, did not "[fall] below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment." Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50.
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Counsel's decision not to object to Davis's testimony was also consistent with his
legal use defense. Davis was the only State investigator who shared defendant's interest
in restoring cars. He was also the lead investigator in the case. Thus, Davis could
provide useful testimony for defendant by highlighting, first, those seized items that were
useful to restoring cars and, second, those items seized for which the State may have
failed to explore possible legal explanations. As the record clearly shows, counsel's
decision not to object to the statements defendant now challenges on appeal as "positive,
unqualified conclusions that Clark was in fact involved in manufacturing meth," Aplt. Br.
at 41, was consistent with that objective: the more absolute Davis's statements, the more
potent for the defense were any subsequent concessions from Davis undermining those
statements.
Thus, although Davis testified that he had only seen a torch like defendant's used
in association with meth and did not believe it had any legitimate uses, see Aplt. Br. at 27
(citing R. 285:257), he acknowledged on cross-examination that such a torch was actually
designed for soldering and that he never looked to see if the torch had been used for that
purpose here (R. 285:256, 258). Similarly, although Davis testified that he '"believed
[the flask with the money in it] . . . was being cleaned out with paper, which I seen
numerous times with meth labs,'" Aplt. Br. at 37 (citing R. 285:269), he conceded on
cross-examination that the same flask was not suitable for use in a meth lab in its current
shape and would have to be "modified for [such] use" (R. 285:287). Finally, although
Davis testified that the iodine in defendant's truck was associated with meth production,
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Davis acknowledged on cross-examination that, even though iodine was used to treat
horses, none of the officers investigating defendant's property had made "any effort to
determine whether or not [defendant] had a connection with ranch property in areas
surrounding Utah" (R. 285:274-75).
Indeed, for almost all of the items Davis identified as incriminating, see Aplt. Br.
at 36-38, defense counsel was able to extract from Davis an admission that those items
also had legal uses consistent with defendant's defense. Thus, Davis admitted that
defendant's shed was full of "literally hundreds of baggies . . . holding things like buttons,
little chunks of metal,..." (R. 285:260-61, 274); that defendant's scale "isn't the kind of
scale you would put in your pocket and head downtown and sell drugs with" (R.
285:266); that the respirator could be used "when spray painting an automobile" and that,
in fact, it was similar to one Davis had in his own shop (R. 285:287); that the coffee
filters could be used for making coffee (R. 285:288); that the other filters "were paint
straining filters" and were consistent with the painting compressor in defendant's yard (R.
285:288); that he had seen acetone used "to clean up a spill" (R. 285:268); and, that
muriatic acid "works for rust removal" and "may be popular" for that purpose (R.
285:268).
All of these concessions by Davis—which helped further defendant's legal use
defense—were made stronger by Davis's forceful statements to the contrary only a short
while earlier. Thus, counsel's decision not to object to those statements was "sound trial
strategy." Litherland, 2000 UT 76, at ^ 19.
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Obviously, defense counsel's attempt to undermine the State's evidence through
Milburn's and Davis's testimony was not ultimately successful. However, '"the fact that
[counsel's strategy] did not produce the expected result does not constitute
ineffectiveness of counsel.'" Parsons, 871 P.2d at 524 (quoting Bullock, 791 P.2d at 160).
Because defense counsel's decision not to challenge Milburn's and Davis's
testimony was consistent with a sound trial strategy, that decision did not constitute
deficient performance. Thus, defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails.
C.

Even assuming counsel's performance was deficient, defendant
was not prejudiced because Milburn's testimony was merely
cumulative; defendant challenges Davis's testimony only as to
form, not substance; and the unchallenged evidence against
defendant was overwhelming.

Even assuming counsel was deficient on the grounds defendant claims, defendant
has not demonstrated the second Strickland prong: that "'there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.'" Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 874 (Utah 1993) (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694).
First, defendant concedes that the testimony from Milburn he now challenges was
merely "cumulative" of "the superior testimony of the State's other witnesses." See Aplt.
Br. at 29-30 (stating "the superior testimony of the State's other witnesses . . . rendered]
Milburn's testimony unhelpful and cumulative").
Second, defendant does not claim that Davis's testimony was inadmissible.
Rather, he claims only that some of Davis's statements were "inappropriate" in their form
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because they spoke "in terms of absolutes rather than in a qualified manner." Aplt. Br. at
40-41. Thus, even assuming an objection on that basis would have been fruitful,
testimony from Davis that the items found on defendant's property were consistent with
meth production would still have been admissible.
Finally, even absent the evidence challenged on appeal, the evidence against
defendant was overwhelming. Six police officers testified that the smell in defendant's
shed and some sixty-nine items taken from his property, most of which defendant
conceded were his, were consistent with meth production (R. 284:67, 69, 70, 74; R.
284:126; R. 284:140, 147-48; R. 285:198, 204-07, 234; R. 285:253-54, 285-86; R.
285:353-62, 363-64, 368-69). The only items needed for meth production that defendant
lacked—i.e, red phosphorus and possibly pH strips and rock salt—could easily be
obtained by "a trip to the grocery store" (R. 285:394).
The State also presented lab results showing the presence of meth in both powder
and liquid form, both of which defendant admitted possessing; iodine and
pseudoephedrine, both meth precursors; and a mixture of meth and pseudoephedrine
consistent with a cooking process in which all the pseudoephedrine was not used up (R.
285:318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323-24, 339, 344, 348, 394; R. 286:431-32, 437-38, 44142).
Lastly, Yvette Bickley, a former meth addict who had purchased meth from
defendant "a couple of times," testified that she had seen defendant operating a meth lab
in his shed and that, at the time, defendant admitted he was cooking "dope" (R. 284:159-
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64). Bickley also testified that after Milburn had visited defendant's home, defendant
gave her a box to hide in her basement, which defendant said contained his meth lab (R.
284:164-65).
Under all these circumstances, defendant cannot show that, absent the testimony
he now challenges, "there is a reasonable probability that... the result of [his trial]
would have been different.'" Fernandez, 870 P.2d at 874 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694). See State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, f 46, 55 P.3d 573 ("Where evidence
[erroneously] admitted . . . is merely cumulative, it may be deemed harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt."); State v. Thomas, 111 P.2d 445, 450 (Utah 1989) (holding erroneous
admission of evidence was harmless where "testimony was merely cumulative"); State v.
Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1987); State v. Bundy, 684 P.2d 58, 61 (Utah 1984); see
also State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 70-71 (Utah 1993) (holding erroneous admission of
evidence was harmless where "there was ample evidence to convict defendant even
without this testimony"); State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1214 (Utah 1989) (holding
erroneous admission of evidence, even if of constitutional magnitude, was harmless
where "State's case . . . was very strong").
None of defendant's contentions undermine this conclusion. First, defendant
claims that "even the trial court commented on the weakness of the State's case, stating
that there was not enough for a conviction even considering the testimony of Milburn,
Marshall, Acocks, Denny and Jorgensen." Aplt. Br. at 42 (citing R. 285:246). However,
the trial court never stated that the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant, nor
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could it (R. 285:246). Bickley had already testified that she had seen defendant operating
what he admitted was a meth lab (R. 284:155-84). That testimony alone was sufficient to
convict defendant. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4, 57-37d-5 (Supp. 2001). Rather, the
trial court's comments were directed at the speed with which the State's case was being
developed, not with its overall strength (R. 285:246: "I don't want to waste a lot of time .
. . . We have heard a lot of stuff in the last day and hour and a half, and we don't have a
lot of meat here.... We are just wasting people's time."). Consequently, when the
prosecutor objected to the court's comments, reminding it that "it is my burden of proof,
your Honor," the court stated: "I understand. All I am saying is you need to move this
case along, eliminate the chaff, just get to the wheat here. Let's get to the nuts and bolts.
Let's move the case. That's all I am asking" (R. 285:247). Moreover, at the time of the
court's comments, some of the most compelling evidence, offered through Davis, Payne,
and the crime lab experts, was still to come.
Alternatively, defendant claims the evidence was weak because none of the
investigating officers "testified that they saw meth cooking at the time of the search, that
they had any surveillance information that [defendant] was observed cooking meth in the
past, that people came and went frequently from his house as is normal in houses
containing meth labs, or that any drug transactions occurred at the house," and because
"the investigating officers did not find all the ingredients necessary to cook meth." Aplt
Br. at 43-44, 48. None of these facts undermines the strength of the State's evidence.
Payne testified that, of the 200 plus labs he has investigated, only a "small percentage"
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were actually "up and running." Thus, finding labs while they are actually operating is
"definitely not the norm" (R. 285:393). Davis testified that "I don't associate traffic with
[meth labs], because patterns with meth cooks that I have arrested, they don't let anybody
around their cook, usually, when they are cooking. So it is usually dead, traffic-wise" (R.
285:280). Bickley testified that defendant had sold her meth "a couple of times," whether
or not those transactions occurred at defendant's home, and that she once saw defendant
operating a meth lab (R. 284:162-63). Finally, Payne testified that the only items
defendant lacked to make meth—red phosphorus and possibly pH strips and salt—could
easily be obtained by "a trip to the grocery store" (R. 285:394).
Defendant also claims the evidence was weak because Bickley's testimony was
not credible in that she "had a strong motivation to lie" to receive preferential treatment
from the State in her case and to avoid losing custody of her children if she went to
prison. Aplt. Br. at 43-44. Although the State did offer Bickley a deal in exchange for
her testimony, Bickley apparently rejected the State's offer, testifying "I am not willing to
take that. I am going to trial," even though she was afraid she would lose her children if
convicted on the meth lab charge (R. 284:170-71, 187). In any event, Bickley's
testimony that defendant operated a meth lab did not stand alone; rather, it was
corroborated by and highly corroborative of the State' s other compelling evidence.
Finally, defendant claims the evidence was weak because some of the items found
in his shed gave only preliminary indications of the presence of meth and others "lack[ed]
a compelling connection to [him]." Aplt. Br. at 44-45. Neither of these contentions are
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persuasive. First, lab results definitively confirmed that meth in both powder and liquid
form, a mix of meth and pseudoephedrine, pseudoephedrine by itself, and iodine—all
consistent with meth production—were present in or near defendant's shed (R. 285:318,
319, 320, 321, 322, 323-24, 339, 344, 348, 394; R. 286:431-32, 437-38, 441-42). In light
of these facts, evidence that other substances gave preliminary indications of meth
strengthened, rather than weakened, the State's case against defendant. Second,
defendant's contention that the iodine and vent tube found in the truck and the baby jars
found in his shed "lack[ed] a compelling connection" to him ignores the fact that their
presence of on his property was sufficient by itself to establish such a connection. The
only evidence establishing a lack of connection to those items was defendant's own
testimony. See Aplt. Br. at 45. The jury apparently found defendant not credible.
For all of the above-stated reasons, defendant has not shown that he was
prejudiced by his trial counsel's performance, even if it was deficient. Consequently,
defendant's claim fails.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's
convictions and sentences.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED Z±_ March 2003.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A

U.S. Lonsl Anieiul \'I
[Rights of accused.!
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the.right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence,

Utah Const., art. I, § 12
Sec 11 2 [Rights oi a c:r in used persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

